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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
A. Z. RICHARDS and A. H. SORENSEN, 
Partners, doing business under the 
firm name of CALDWELL, RICHARDS & 
SORENSEN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
LAKE HILLS, a corporation 
Defendant and Appellant 
Appellant's Brief 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Case No. 
9g85 
This is an action to recover for the value of engineering 
services rendered by the Plaintiff for the Defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried by the court without a jury. From a 
verdict and judgment for the Plaintiff, Defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment al1ld judgment 
in its favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Z. Richards, a partner in the Plaintiff firm was en-
gaged by Charles Merrill, agent for the Defendant, to do the 
engineering for 3 cemetery. They had worked together before 
on other similar projects. (R5) The arrangements in this matter 
were discussed first in April, 1954. (R 14) Services were ren-
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dered from that time until 1 96o on the Lake Hills Memorial 
Park, IOIOI South State, Salt Lake County. Many maps and 
drawings were prepared laying out the roads and various sec-
tions of the burial grounds. Much of the work was done at the 
home of A. Z. Richards. Arrangements as to time of payment 
were n,ebulous with the Defendant's agents Merrill and Jex 
contending that Richards agreed to do the work on his own 
time and to await payment until the land was paid. There 
was agreement that the services were to be billed at double the 
amount. (R 6) Statements were rendered accordingly, the first 
on December I, I955 regular price $4,I98.2o, then doubled. 
Discussion of payment was had in July, 1960 and a $w,-
ooo.oo Debenture Bond was prepared, charged, tendered and 
received by the Plaintiff. (R 46) Defendant contends there was 
an accord and satisfaction with the bond. Plaintiff contends it 
was a tender only and Plaintiff was entitled to the reasonable 
value of the services within a reasonable time. The bond ten-
dered was one payable by the Defendant from a proposed sink-
ing fund to be payable in I 97 5. 
The lower court entered judgment against the Defendant 
in the sum of $9,6 I 6.81. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING QUANTUM 
MERUIT FOR THE PLAINTIFF. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED A FINDING OF AC-
CORD AND SATISFACTION WHICH THE COURT 
SHOULD BE RENDERED. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW 
MR. HOMER R. DON TO TESTIFY CONCERNING THE 
DEBENTURE BOND AND ITS ISSUANCE. 
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POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING QUANTUl\1 
MERUIT FOR THE PLAINTIFF. 
Where there is proof of a special agreement to pay a par-
ticular amount or in a particular manner, the law will not im-
ply a promise to pay the value of services rendered. 
58 Am. Jur. Work and Labor p 515 
Gjurich vs. Fieg (Cal) 129 p 464 
Here, there was ·a special agreement between the parties 
as to the time and method of payment. The Plaintiff, Richards, 
stated that he was not concerned about payment when he 
stated (R 6): 
" . . we never talked about pay for a long time, 
quite a long time. I think several months-probably more. 
I wasn't concerned. I figured that he would treat me all 
right and I think the next time we talked, when I talked 
about it and he said, 'Well, you keep track of your time 
and you just consider it double your regular fee; your 
regular expense. You just keep track of it and make it 
double what you ordinarily would do', which I did." 
The first discussion as to time of payment was had at the 
cemetery in April, 1954· Mr. Merrill said (R 41): 
"I'm trying to build a Memorial Park. I know you 
know how to set up the engineering. I cannot pay you, 
this is a non-profit park. We have no stockholders to 
get the money from. I am waiting for my money. I put 
money in this park and I am going to wait for my 
money. Now if you want to do the same as me, we will 
double your fee." 
William R. Jex testified of a similar arrangement for him-
self and that Richards acknowledged and supported such an 
agreement (R 58): 
"I told him yes, I was interested in investing money. 
and told him that it looked like this would be a good 
thing; . that it might take some time to develop and I 
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was going to put mine in and wait until it developed anod 
get the ground paid for, and what not, before we 
realized any money out of it. And he said he was doing 
the same thing. He was going to do the work and he 
was waiting for the money the same as I was." 
Richards' testimony was inconsistent. First he said he 
agreed to the double fe~ and to wait for his money. (See exhibit 
# 2) Next he stated he sent the bond back because it did not 
cover the double fee. (R 69) 
"Q: Now when you returned the bond to Mr. Mer-
rill and stated that the bond of $ 1 o,ooo.oo didn't cover 
the cost incurred, you were referring to the double fig-
ure of $I ~ooo.oo were you not? 
"A: That's right." 
This after he had stated his position and tried to change 
the arrangements between the parties (R 12): 
"Q: Well, will you state then, Mr. Richards, the 
substance of that conversation you had in 1960 or I¢I? 
"A: I was concerned about my finances. I needed 
money and I called Charlie to see if he couldn't arrange 
to let me have some mon.ey on this account, so I could 
have something that I could raise some money on." 
Under cross examination Mr. Richards further admitted 
the agreement to wait (R I 5): 
"Q: And do you recall at that time Mr. Jex mak-
ing the statement to you that he had to wait for his 
mop.ey, too? 
"A: Oh, he may have done, but I don't think he 
talked about salaries or me being paid. He may have 
said that. 
"Q: Do you recall making a statement to him that 
you knew you were going to have to wait for your 
money for a while? 
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"Oh, I don't remember saying it, but I could have 
said it very well. I had an understanding definitely with 
Charlie that we wouldn't be paid promptly as the work 
was done." 
Unless there was a new agreement reached between the 
parties, the former agreement must stand. The substance of the 
first was that Richards would wait for his money until the land 
was paid and then he would get double the fee for waiting. 
The court has no right to make a new agreement for the par-
ties. However, the parties, at Mr. Richards' insistence, discussed 
new arrangements and payment by bond was discussed. Mr. 
Richards, holding to the first agreement sent the bond back be-
cause it did not cover double the fee. Merrill alleged the 
satisfaction of $I o,ooo.oo with a bond specifying a definite 
date of payment in I975· Richards, after holding the bond sev-
eral days unilaterally declared the new arrangements unsatis-
factory and then refused to abide by the original arrangements 
which specifically covered the payment of the work. 
Thus, the theory of Quantum Meruit was errol1!Cously ap-
plied by the trial court. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED A FINDING OF AC-
CORD AND SATISFACTION WHICH THE COURT 
SHOULD HAVE RENDERED. 
From the testimony given to the Court it was clear that 
the parties herein agreed to a sum for the work done, that 
sum being $I o,oooo.oo, and that the Debenture Bond presented 
by Mr. Merrill to Mr. Richards in that amount would consti-
tute payment thereof. This agreement, of course, ·constituted 
satisfaction of the debt in a different medium from that called 
for by the original agreement of payment when land was sold, 
thereby bringing it within the general rule set forth in I Am. 
Jr. Accord and Satisfaction p 242: 
"It is well recognized that if a creditor accepts pay-
ment of a liquidated demand in a different mode or 
medium from that called for by the contract between 
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the parties, in full discharge of the demand, there is a 
sufficient new or additional consideration to support the 
transaction as an accord and satisfaction." 
The following questions suggest themselves in this point: 
( I ) Did the parties agree that the Debenture Bond would be 
accepted as payment of the account? ( 2) And, if so, was there 
consideration for this alleged agreement. 
We believe that both questions must be answered affirma-
tively. The evidence shows that the sum of $ IO,ooo.oo was a fig-
ure discussed by the parties, based upon the actual services ren-
dered and the agreed "double" price to be paid, as the com-
promised payment figure based upon acceptance of the bond. 
The same was adequate consideration for the agreement. 
From the evidence it appears that the Plaintiff did accept 
the bond and that the matter then came under the general rule 
of accord and satisfaction. This general rule was set forth in 
Reeves and Co. vs. Phillips (Okla) I 56 p 1 179. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW 
MR. HOMER R. DON TO TESTIFY CONCERNING THE 
DEBENTURE BOND AND ITS ISSUANCE. 
The court sustained the objection of Plaintiff's attorney to 
Defendant's questioning of Mr. Homer R. Don concerning the 
issuance of the Debenture Bond issued to the Plaintiff Richards 
by the Defendant. The Appellant now argues that the Court, 
by sustaining this objection, erred. 
The matter of the Debenture Bond, its issuance and ac-
ceptance, was testified to by the Plaintiff Richards, by the 
Plaintiff's witness Valle, and by the Defendant's witness Mer-
rill. In the testimony of each of the witnesses, the matter of 
discussion concerning the acceptance of the bond, the amount 
of the bond, the type and nature of the bond, and its actual 
presentation were all heard by the court. In order to have the 
full facts of the manner in: which the bond was actually issued, 
executed, and presented since the same was not denied by any 
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of the witnesses, the Court should have permitted the testi-
mony of Mr. Don with reference to these items since he was 
the person who actually prepared the bond for signature and 
delivery. Failure of the court to permit this testimony after ac-
cepting the previous testimony of the witnesses, constitutes prej-
udicial error since the issuance, delivery, and acceptance of the 
bond was basic to the establishment of Defendant's position in 
the case before the court. 
SUMMARY 
From the evidence before the court it is apparent that the 
parties at the time of the original negotiations agreed that the 
Plaintiff Richards should perform the work involved and that 
he would, together with the other members of the Lake Hills 
organization, wait until the completion of the project for the 
payment of his funds. That as consideration for the delay in this 
payment he was to receive double the normal fees charged for 
the services rendered. This agreement was apparently accept-
able to the Plaintiff since the matter continued for six years 
without demand for payment. Thereafter, the Plaintiff not 
making a formal demand for payment, but requesting that some 
evidence of payment be presented, discussed with the Defendant 
the acceptance of a Debenture Bond in a sum which sum was 
detennined by the parties to be in the amount of $I o,ooo.oo to 
represent payment of the account then existing. It appears that 
under the new agreement the figure of $I o,ooo.oo was agreed 
upon by the parties as being an amount adequate to cover the 
expenses involved and that acceptance of the bond would give 
a specific date of payment rather than a oon-specific date 
theretofore accepted by the parties, which date was the date 
that the land was paid for. The evidence further shows that the 
bond was accepted by the Plaintiff and held by Mr. Richards, 
which completes the requirements to show that the bond was 
accepted in the place of the money account carried by the 
Plaintiff Richards. The Plaintiff then tried to abbrogate all 
agreements between the parties and brought the action in the 
court below as a means of altering the agreements between the 
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parties. It is the opinion of the Appellant herein that there 
was an actual accord and satisfaction between the parties and 
that the Debel1!ture Bond was accepted and received by the 
Plaintiff thereunder. It is further the opinion of the Apellant 
that the failure of the court to find an accord and satisfac-
tion and the court's failure to permit all of the evidence in 
support of said position to be heard by the court constitutes 
error by the court and that the matter should be referred to 
the District Court for re-trial in order that the full disclosure 
of the facts and agreements of the parties can be made. 
The Defendant-Appellant herein prays that this court re-
verse the judgment of the lower court and order judgment en-
tered for the Defendant, or if such reversal not be granted 
that a new trial be ordered with instructions that the lower 
court permit all of the evidence to be presented to the court as 
set forth herein. 
The Defendant-Appellant herein prays that this court re-
of fact do oot support a judgment for the Plaintiff and that 
exercise of this ·court's responsibility to review the record and 
evidence before the trial court will substantiate the Defendant's 
position that there was in fact an accord and satisfaction be-
tween the parties and that the account sued upon by the Plain-
tiff was in fact satisfied by the acceptance of the Debenture 
Bond. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT REES DANSIE and 
WALTER R. ELLETT, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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